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I. INTRODUCTION
It has been the subject of U.S. Supreme Court dicta' and
congressional speculation,2 and lately, ripe fodder for punditry on both
sides of the ideological aisle, but for all its answer could possibly
portend, the question remains unsettled: Can the government
constitutionally prosecute the media for revealing national security
secrets in news stories, and if so, under what circumstances?
The Espionage Act of 19173 would likely be the source of such
prosecution. Passed at the onset of American involvement in World War
One, the Act prohibits, among other things, the willful communication of
"information relating to the national defense" that "the possessor has
reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation" to "any person not entitled to receive
it.'4 Nowhere does the Act exempt the media from liability, and yet
naturally, given the sacrosanct status of the country's free press, the
government has been reluctant to prosecute the media under the Act's
broad umbrella. With no cases before them, courts have not had an
opportunity to determine whether such a charge would pass
constitutional muster.
In dicta, the Supreme Court has suggested that such a prosecution
would be constitutional,5 and building on that premise, in August 2006,
the Eastern District of Virginia found in United States v. Rosen6 that
prosecuting two lobbyists under the Act did not violate the lobbyists'
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1. See infra Part IL.B (discussing "Pentagon Papers" case).
2. See infra Part III.A (discussing congressional uncertainty about the implications of the
Espionage Act).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2000).
4. Id. § 793(e).
5. See infra Part ll.B. (discussing the "Pentagon Papers" case).
6. 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 641 (E.D. Va. 2006).
1027
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
right of free speech. 7 While prosecuting a lobbyist is obviously not the
same as prosecuting a newspaper or a television station, Rosen is
nevertheless significant because it demonstrates the courts' willingness
to enforce the Act against "those not in a position of trust with the
government." 8  In prior cases, such as United States v. Morison,9 the
government had only targeted individuals it had authorized to access the
information and who subsequently leaked it.'0  The defendant in
Morison, for example, worked at the Naval Intelligence Support Center
and had a security clearance of "Top Secret-Sensitive Compartmented
Information." ' 1 The lobbyists in Rosen, in contrast, had no clearance and
arguably no responsibility to the government to keep the information
private. 12
Nevertheless, the court in Rosen concluded that "both common sense
and the relevant precedent point persuasively to the conclusion that the
government can punish those outside of the government for the
unauthorized receipt and deliberate retransmission of information
relating to the national defense."'1 3 The "relevant precedent" to which the
court referred was New York Times Co. v. United States,'4 the "Pentagon
Papers" case, and specifically the dicta therein that specified the Act
could impose liability on media outlets for publishing national security-
related information.'
5
Given the volatile climate of today's "War on Terror" and the
classified information that undoubtedly springs from the war in
voluminous waves, it is only a matter of time before the Court has the
opportunity to write more than dicta about the issue. Reporters Dana
Priest of The Washington Post and James Risen and Eric Lichtblau of
The New York Times won 2006 Pulitzer Prizes 16 for breaking stories on
secret government prisons in Europe' 7 and the National Security
7. Id. at 641.
8. See id. at 637 (concluding that "the government can punish those outside of the government
for the unauthorized receipt and transmission of information relating to the national defense").
9. 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
10. Id. at 1085.
11. Id. at 1060.
12. See Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 636 (stating that the lobbyists "have not violated a position of
trust with the government").
13. Id. at 637.
14. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
15. See id at 742 (stating that in some situations the government may invoke equity jurisdiction
to prevent "publication of material damaging to 'national security"').
16. The Pulitzer Prizes, http://www.pulitzer.org/2006/2006.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2007).
17. Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at
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Agency's (NSA) secret domestic wiretapping program,' 8 respectively,
but there were those who said the reporters deserved jail time for
revealing national security secrets. 19
This Comment proposes to examine media liability under the
Espionage Act, considering the history of the Act and balancing the issue
of media liability against the legislative intent that created the Act, public
policy, and the Constitution. Ultimately, the Comment will conclude
that, in all three respects, the Espionage Act is a poor tool for holding
media outlets liable because it is broad and unwieldy. The government
should have some means to punish those who reveal secrets that by their
revelation truly jeopardize national security, even when the culprits are
newspapers or television stations, but in balancing the competing
interests of the free press and national security, the Espionage Act tilts
impermissibly in favor of the latter. Limits on the press, if they exist,
should be as defined and as unrestrictive as the most vital interests of
national security will allow.
II. BACKGROUND: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT
A. Initial Enactment and Rejection of the Press Censorship Provision
The Espionage Act of 1917 was passed at the beginning of American
involvement in World War One 20 as a response to Department of Justice
(DOJ) concerns that "existing federal laws would be insufficient 'to
regulate the conduct of the individual during war time."' 21 Specifically,
the DOJ "wanted to repress 'political agitation ... of a character directly
affecting the safety of the state,' particularly 'disloyal propaganda'
threatening the formation and maintenance of the armed forces."
22
Passage of the Act took "nine weeks of grueling debate," much of which
focused on the Act's potential to conflict with the First Amendment.
23
18. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al.
19. See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
20. Geoffrey R. Stone, Judge Learned Hand and the Espionage Act of 1917: A Mystery
Unraveled, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 336 (2003).
21. David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1205, 1217 (1983) (citing John Lord O'Brien, Civil Liberty in War Time, 42 REP. N.Y. ST. B.
ASS'N 275, 299 (1919)).
22. Id. (citing O'Brien, supra note 21, at 277, 300).
23. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION
ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 151-52 (2004).
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None of the Act's provisions explicitly reference the media-neither
admitting media liability nor excluding it;24 however, one might argue
that the Act was passed with some deference to the "free press." When
Congress originally considered the statute, it contained a "press
censorship" provision that would have allowed the government to
prosecute the press for publishing information that "the President, in his
judgment, declared to be 'of such character that it is or might be useful to
the enemy."'
' 25
The majority of the press vehemently opposed the provision.26
Congress was more divided, trading arguments that remain familiar
today. Supporters of the provision stressed placing trust in the Executive
to take the necessary measures to protect national security. 27 The
opposition argued that the provision was contrary to values of American
democracy.28 After fierce debate, Congress ultimately omitted the
provision before passing the Act.29
Nevertheless, there are several provisions of the Act that the
government could conceivably use against the press, a couple of which
explicitly prohibit the "publication" of certain types of materials. For
instance, § 794(b) prohibits publication of certain defense-related
information in "time of war, with intent that the same shall be
communicated to the enemy. 30  Section 797 proscribes publishing and
selling photographs of defense installations under certain
circumstances, 31 and § 798, dealing with disclosure of classified
24. Id.
25. Stone, supra note 20, at 345.
26. See, e.g., Publishers Call for a Free Press; Declare That Only Restrictions Needed are
Upon Messages Leaving the Country, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1917, at 4 ("The American Newspaper
Publishers Association, in annual convention assembled at the Waldorf-Astoria yesterday, passed a
resolution urging upon Congress the elimination of the press censorship provision from the
Espionage bill now pending. The vote was unanimous.").
27. Stone, supra note 20, at 347 (citing 55 CONG. REC. H1592 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1917)
(statement of Rep. Webb)).
28. Id. at 348 (citing 55 CONG. REC. H1773 (daily ed. May 11, 1917) (statement of Rep.
Madden)).
29. Id. at 349.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 794(b) (2000).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 797 (2000). This provision provides that:
On and after thirty days from the date upon which the President defines any vital military
or naval installation or equipment as being within the category contemplated under
section 795 of this title whoever reproduces, publishes, sells, or gives away any
photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of the vital
military or naval installations or equipment so defined, without first obtaining permission
of the commanding officer of the military or naval post, camp, or station concerned, or
higher authority, unless such photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical
representation has clearly indicated thereon that it has been censored by the proper
1030 [Vol. 55
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information, proscribes publication of information encompassed within
several delineated categories.32
The aforementioned provisions aside, ironically the provision of the
Act that many view as posing the greatest threat to the media is one that
does not reference "publication" at all: § 793(e). That provision, which
Congress added in 1950, 33  effectively makes it illegal to have
unauthorized possession of "national defense"-related information and to
willfully convey that information. 34 Its breadth compared with the rest of
the Act makes it particularly threatening to the media outlet that dabbles
in national security information.35  It is this particular provision that
Judge Ellis expressly deems constitutional in his denial of the
defendants' motion to dismiss in Rosen.
36
military or naval authority, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
Id.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2000). Section 798(a) prohibits knowing and willful publication of
classified information
(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic
system of the United States or any foreign government; or (2) concerning the design,
construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or
prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for
cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or (3) concerning the
communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or
(4) obtained by the process of communication intelligence from the communications of
any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes ....
Id.
33. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 942 (1973).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000).
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document,
writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint,
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or
information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to
believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it,
or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United
States entitled to receive it ....
Id.
35. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 33, at 998 ("[T]hey [§ 793(d) and (e)] are also the
statutes that pose the greatest threat to the acquisition and publication of defense information by
reporters and newspapers.").
36. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 643 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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B. Considering the Past Interplay Between the Espionage Act and the
Press
Few Espionage Act cases have even indirectly involved the press,
and threats aside, the government has never prosecuted a media outlet
under the Act for disseminating government secrets-despite
innumerable news stories that have revealed classified information.37
The most recent examples that come to mind regarding prominent news
stories that conceivably could have violated the Act were published in
The New York Times38  and The Washington Post39  and dealt,
respectively, with the NSA's secret domestic wiretapping program and
secret government prisons in Europe. Both stories used classified
information and prompted DOJ investigations. 40 The government has yet
to initiate any criminal proceeding, but there is no shortage of advocates
who claim it has a legal right to do so.
41
An older, equally pertinent example concerns the Pentagon Papers,
which first The New York Times and then The Washington Post
published in excerpts in 1971 .42 The Pentagon Papers were a top-secret
study that essentially contained a history of American strategy in
37. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 33, at 1000 ("If these statutes mean what they seem to say
and are constitutional, public speech in this country since World War II has been rife with
criminality."). University of Chicago Law Professor Geoffrey Stone notes a couple of occasions
when the government used the Act to prosecute German-American newspapers during the First
World War, but these prosecutions dealt more with sedition than government secrets, and so are not
really analogous to the situation addressed here. See STONE, supra note 23, at 210 (citing Schaefer
v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482 (1920) (upholding conviction of three men associated with a
German-American newspaper for translating English stories to reflect a bias in favor of the
Germans); Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (reversing, on procedural gounds, a criminal
conviction of a former editor of a German-American newspaper whom the government accused of
publishing anti-American editorials)).
38. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 18.
39. Priest, supra note 17.
40. Nat Hentoff, Chilling Free Speech, WASH. TIMES, May 8,2006, at AI8.
41. See, e.g., Michael Barone, The Reach of the Espionage Act, Mar. 1, 2006,
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/opinionibaroneblog/archives/060301/the-reach of-th.htm (last
visited Apr. 20, 2007) ("[T]hat the conduct of the Times and its sources in government is covered by
these statutes is, I think, irrefutable."); Andrew C. McCarthy, Reporters and Investigations, NAT'L
REV. ONLINE, Apr. 25, 2006, http://search.nationalreview.com (search "Search Terms" for
"'Reporters and Investigations"'; then follow "Reporters and Investigations" hyperlink under
"Search Results") (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (arguing that the newspaper stories about the NSA
wiretaps and secret government prisons in Europe constitute situations where the "reporters are
theoretically complicit in criminal activity"); Gabriel Schoenfeld, Has the "New York Times"
Violated the Espionage Act, COMMENT. MAG., Mar. 2006, at 23. Schoenfeld advocates holding the
media accountable for news stories containing national security secrets, although he is critical of the
Espionage Act. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Op-Ed., Weak on Leaks, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2006, at M1.
42. DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON
PAPERS CASE 1-2 (1996).
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Vietnam. 3 The federal government tried to halt publication of the
material by petitioning for an injunction.44 The case quickly made its
way to the Supreme Court and ultimately spawned ten different
opinions. 5 Despite denying the government its requested injunction,
three of the concurring opinions seemed to affirm at least the possibility
of prosecuting the newspaper under the Espionage Act.46 For whatever
reason, the government declined to do so, and the Court never had the
opportunity to turn its dicta into a holding.47
The "Pentagon Papers" case notwithstanding, an Espionage Act
prosecution never directly implicated the media until United States v.
48Morison. The case concerned a former employee of the Naval
Intelligence Support Center (NISC) who stole and released secret
photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to an English periodical. 49 The
court dismissed the defendant's contentions that the Act did not prohibit
unauthorized leaks of information to the press.50 The court also rejected
the defendant's claims that the Act was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad. 51 Although Morison was not a case of the government
directly prosecuting the media, commentators nevertheless viewed it as a
threat to the right to publish national security information. 2
Rosen is the latest chapter in the saga, and it takes the Morison threat
a step further by affirming the constitutionality of using the Act to
prosecute individuals who were not the source of the initial leak and who
never had authorized access to the leaked information.53
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2.
45. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 720, 724, 727, 730, 740, 748, 752,
759 (1971) (including a per curiam opinion and nine individual opinions).
46. See id at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting Congress can enact laws to protect
government secrets); id. at 733-34 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the Congress that enacted
the Act felt newspapers could be subject to prosecution); id. at 745 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting the Act as criminalizing the publication of information relating to the national defense).
47. RUDENSTINE, supra note 42, at 343.
48. 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
49. Id. at 1060-62.
50. Id. at 1070.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., David H. Topoi, Note, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First Amendment
Right to Publish National Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REv. 581, 590-91 (1992) ("Morison's
conviction raises an obvious issue concerning the erosion of First Amendment rights by prosecuting
individuals who leak to the press.").
53. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 637 (E.D. Va. 2006).
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C. Looking at Rosen
1. Underlying Facts of the Case
The defendants in Rosen are former employees of the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), an organization that lobbies
the American government on behalf of Israeli interests.54  In its
indictment, the government alleged that the former lobbyists "cultivated
relationships with government officials with access to sensitive U.S.
government information, including [national defense information], . . .
obtained the information from these officials, and . . . transmitted the
information to persons not otherwise entitled to receive it, including
members of the media, foreign policy analysts, and officials of a foreign
government." 55  Neither of the lobbyists had any sort of security
clearance that would have authorized them access to the information in
question.56 In all cases, they obtained the information from government
officials with such clearance who willingly divulged it.57 There is no
accusation that they stole the information or used any kind of illegal
means to acquire it. The information related to a variety of foreign
policy issues, including terrorism in Central Asia, U.S. strategy in the
Middle East, and Al-Qaeda.58 In all cases, the two defendants appeared
to know they were dealing with highly sensitive and classified material.
They responded to the suit by attacking its constitutionality on three
grounds. First, they claimed that the "prosecution violates the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause under the vagueness doctrine because
[the Espionage Act's] indeterminate language failed to provide [them]
with adequate warning that their conduct was proscribed., 59 Second,
they argued that the prosecution violated their First Amendment rights of
free speech and to petition the government. 60 Finally, they claimed that
the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad. 6' The court, citing the
government's compelling interest in protecting the country's national
security, rejected all three arguments and found the statute to be
constitutional.62
54. Id at 607.
55. Id. at 608.
56. Id.





62. Id. at 645.
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2. Significance of the Case's Implications
Rosen, at this point, is far from a Supreme Court precedent, and even
supposing it circulates through the appellate process and attains such
status, it is still not a case of the government prosecuting the press.
Nevertheless, the government in Rosen essentially aims to punish the
defendants, who lacked security clearance, for listening to, receiving, and
communicating sensitive information-something members of the media
do routinely in reporting news stories about national and international
affairs. Opening up the door for Espionage Act prosecutions of
nongovernment officials effectually opens up the door for using the Act
to go after members of the media. If Judge Ellis's decision survives
appeal, all that is left is for the government to put the theory into practice
by bringing a newspaper or television station into court.
III. ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS WITH ROSEN AND WITH THE GENERAL
NOTION OF MEDIA LIABILITY UNDER § 793(e).
A. Introductory Overview
Whatever the logic of the Rosen decision, the constitutionality of §
793(e) and its suitability for the problem at hand are far from foregone
conclusions. Judge Ellis concedes that the section provides a "more
difficult question" with respect to reconciling its mandate with the First
Amendment, but relies on the persuasive line of logic that the
government needs to have some mode of recourse to stop subsequent
communication of national defense-related information once an initial
leak has occurred.63
Ellis's reasoning may be difficult to dispute. Surely the government
does need some method to stop the ripple effect of the first leak. The
question is whether § 793(e) of the Espionage Act is the right tool for the
job. Not even Congress really knows what the government can and
cannot do under the Act's authority. Pondering the possibility of using
the Act against the press, Senator Arlen Specter said, in a May 2, 2006
63. Id. at 637. Judge Ellis wrote:
In essence, [the defendants'] position is that once a government secret has been leaked to
the general public and the first line of defense thereby breached, the government has no
recourse but to sit back and watch as the threat to the national security caused by the first




senate judiciary committee hearing, that determining whether the
government could prosecute the media under the Act was "a serious
question [requiring] oversight and consideration of congressional
intent.' 64  Former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said there
was "a possibility" that the government could use the Act against the
media.65 Yet read the straight language of the statute itself, and the
answer to the question would seem to be a definitive "yes. 66 The media
can satisfy the requisite elements of the offense; they enjoy no statutory
immunity-so why all the hesitation about holding them liable? The
answer to that question seems to revolve around three considerations: the
Constitution, congressional intent in passing the Act, and public policy.
B. Analyzing the Constitutionality of§ 793(e) and its Application to the
Media
1. The Vagueness Doctrine
The first constitutional challenge that the defendants in Rosen raise
against § 793(e) is the claim that the statute violates due process
requirements because of its vagueness. 67 The essence of the vagueness
argument, which courts have considered before in the Espionage Act
context, 68 is that the "Fifth Amendment prohibits punishment pursuant to
a statute so vague that 'men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.' 69  This sort of
vagueness, however, is not necessarily fatal because courts may clarify
64. Susan Burgess, The Big Chill: An Espionage Act Case in a Virginia Federal Court Exposes
the Murky Standards Governing National Security Discussions, NEWS MEDIA & L., Spring 2006, at
4.
65. Scott Sherman, Chilling the Press, NATION, July 17, 2006, at 4.
66. The text of the statute reads:
Whoever having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document,
writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint,
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or
information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to
believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign
nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated,
delivered, or transmitted, or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be
communicated, delivered, or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it,
or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it to the officer or employee of the United
States entitled to receive it . [s]hall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C § 793(e) (2000).
67. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
68. See infra text accompanying notes 73-80.
69. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 617 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997)).
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the statute with judicial construction.7 ° In this case, in pertinent part, the
defendants allege that the phrase in the statute "information relating to
the national defense" is impermissibly ambiguous. 71  Judge Ellis
concedes that "it has long been recognized that the phrase 'information
relating to the national defense' is quite broad and potentially too broad
since, especially in time of war, any information could conceivably relate
to the national defense. 72  However, he responds to the defendants'
contention by invoking precedents that appear to have already settled the
issue by narrowing the phrase through judicial construction.
In Gorin v. United States,73 the Supreme Court considered a similar
vagueness challenge to the same phrase in § 2(a) of the Espionage Act
74
and proposed to limit the phrase by restricting its application to
information "closely held by the government., 75 Judge Ellis also cites
Morison, which essentially echoes Gorin, adding that the information
cannot have been "made public" or "available to the general public."
76
Morison also requires that "information related to the national defense"
be "'potentially damaging to the United States or useful to an enemy of
the United States.' ' 77 The second limitation, Ellis writes, is important
because it "assures that the government cannot abuse the statute by
penalizing citizens for discussing information the government has no
compelling reason to keep confidential. 78
The defendants also assert their vagueness argument with respect to
the phrase "entitled to receive" in the provision, effectively claiming that
the provision is unclear regarding who is entitled to receive national
defense information.79  The court in Morison considered a similar
contention and found that the Executive Branch determined who was
entitled to receive national defense information by virtue of its
classification system.80  Hence, by designating certain information as
secret and subsequently granting certain officials clearance to gain access
to the information, the Executive answers the question of entitlement.
70. Id. at 618 (citing United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (4th Cir. 1988) ("[A]II
vagueness may be corrected by judicial construction ... .
71. Id. at618-22.
72. Id. at618.
73. 312 U.S. 19 (1941).
74. Id. at 28. Section 2(a) is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
75. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 618 (citing Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28).
76. Id. at 620 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071-72 (4th Cir. 1988)).
77. Id. at 621 (quoting Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071-72).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 622.
80. Morison, 844 F.2d at 1074 (cited in Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 622).
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The defendants in Rosen put an interesting spin on the argument that
the Morison court did not have occasion to consider, specifically arguing
that because they often received their information orally from their
government sources, they did not know what was classified and thus did
not have notice that they were not entitled to receive the information.
81
The court dispatches this argument easily, at least in the context of
vagueness, by referring to the provision's culpability requirement. Judge
Ellis notes that the provision only authorizes liability for willful
conduct.82  Thus, Ellis reasons, the statute is definitively clear on the
consequence of the defendants' potential ignorance. If they did not know
that they were not entitled to receive the information, they would not be
acting willfully and would not be liable.
Whether Judge Ellis's construction of § 793(e) resolves the issue of
vagueness is unclear. Before Morison, Columbia Law Professors Harold
Edgar and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. wrote that the "broad literal meaning of
the subsection[] is almost certainly unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad.''83  In response to Morison's purported narrowing of the
subsection, they concluded that the net effect was simply criminalization
of disseminating all classified materials, a scheme that Congress did not
intend with the Act and one that it had expressly rejected on prior
occasions.84
Considering the Morison court's construction of "information related
to national defense," Maryland Law Professor Peter E. Quint observed
that "a formula of such breadth could cover almost all classified
information." 85 Professor Quint keys on the court's requirement that the
information "is 'potentially' injurious to the country or 'might be useful
to an enemy[,]"' commenting on the limitation's embrace of even
"remote 'potential' injur[ies]. 86  In making this observation, Quint
strikes at the root of the statute's vagueness problem, which also extends
to the provision's scienter requirement.
At least for wrongful communication of intangible national defense
information, the statute requires the actor to have "reason to believe [that
the information] could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
81. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
82. Id. at 625.
83. Edgar& Schmidt, Jr., supra note 33, at 1000.
84. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power and
National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 399 (1986).
85. Peter E. Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the End of
the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 449 (1989).
86. Id.
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advantage of any foreign nation. 87  This phrase is doubly important
because besides forming the basis of part of the provision's scienter
requirement,88 Morison effectively rolls it into the definition of what
constitutes national defense information as well, by purporting to limit
the term to only encompass information that could potentially harm the
United States or aid their enemies. Yet neither the courts nor the statute
define injury or put any parameters on the term or require any degree of
probability that communicating the information will result in the injury.
What does an "injury" in this context entail? 89 What constitutes an
"advantage" to a foreign nation? Clearly there are examples that most
would consider obvious-revealing that intelligence operatives have
cracked an enemy's code, for example, or relaying information that the
country is planning a surprise attack before it happens-but many other
instances are far more nuanced, perhaps allowing the government too
much discretion in defining what constitutes an "injury."
This latitude connects to at least one of the vagueness doctrine's
rationales: disallowing statutes that by their vagueness encourage
"retaliatory or discriminatory application of the law."90  The press, in
particular, by playing its role as government critic, naturally opens itself
up to potential government retaliation. Juxtapose this with the more-
stringent-than-usual vagueness test that courts apply when the statute in
question interferes with speech or expression 91 and it seems clear that
speech, in general, and the press, in particular, deserve at least a more
precise statute.
2. The Overbreadth Doctrine
The essence of a First Amendment overbreadth argument is that an
expression-limiting statute is impermissibly broad in the sense that it
"punishes a 'substantial' amount of protected free speech, 'judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. ' '92 While not preciselyanalogous to the vagueness argument, the overbreadth concept overlaps
87. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000).
88. Id.
89. See Anthony R. Klein, National Security Information: Its Proper Role and Scope in a
Representative Democracy, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 433,439 (1990) ("[W]hat constitutes an injury to the
United States? How grievous must the injury be?").
90. Mardee Sherman, Note, Chaos in the Marketplace: When Subsequent Punishment Leads to
Prior Restraint: Will Cincinnati Ever Get It Right?, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 397,421 (2005).
91. Id. (citing Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982)).




to some extent because overbroad statutes, even when their language
seems deceptively precise, are inherently vague.
However certain the literal terms, actors are not given fair warning
ahead of conduct as to the permissible reach of statutory burdens. A
person contemplating action within the literal scope is left in doubt
whether his claim of privilege will be uoheld, unless his situation is on
all fours with that of an earlier claimant.
The result is a chilling effect on protected speech, because in
deference to the overbroad statute, people will abstain from any speech
that might be proscribed. With respect to the Espionage Act, the chilling
effect derives from the same language that lies at the roots of the
statute's vagueness: specifically, its overbroad embrace of information
and materials relating to the national defense and the ambiguity
regarding what constitutes harm or injury to the United States or an
advantage to a foreign country.94
Thus, unsurprisingly, Judge Ellis's rejection of the overbreadth
argument in Rosen substantially echoes his refutation of the earlier
vagueness argument. He essentially recites the elements of the offense,
concluding that the "statute is narrowly and sensibly tailored to serve the
government's legitimate interest in protecting the national security. 95
Judge Ellis's conclusion here rings with a certain level of irony
considering that he ends his opinion with the seemingly contradictory
call to Congress to revise the statute, declaring that
to even the most casual observer ... the time is ripe for Congress to
engage in a thorough review and revision of these provisions to ensure
that they reflect ... contemporary views about the appropriate balance
between our nation's security and our citizens' ability to engage in
public debate about the United States' conduct in the society of
nations.
96
If Judge Ellis really feels this way, one wonders why he did not initiate
the "review and revision" himself, by recognizing the validity of the
vagueness and overbreadth contentions.
In any case, his rejection of the overbreadth argument is questionable
for the same reason that his vagueness rejection is questionable: it fails to
resolve or even address the scope of what "could harm the United States
93. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 872 (1970).
94. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000).
95. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 643 (E.D. Va. 2006).
96. Id. at 646.
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or aid a foreign nation." The lack of resolution here affects the breadth
of the judicially modified phrase "information related to the national
defense" and the breadth of the scienter requirement, which, with respect
to intangible information, requires the defendant to have "reason to
believe" the information could be harmful to the United States or
advantageous to a foreign country.
Admittedly, Rosen does appear to give some limiting effect to the
scienter requirement by incorporating into the analysis an element of
"bad faith," which it traces back to Gorin-but exactly what limiting
effect this incorporation actually has, or if a "bad faith" standard is even
appropriate in § 793(e), is unclear. Gorin considered a section of the
Espionage Act that required stricter culpability, specifically that
defendants acted with "intent or reason to believe that the information to
be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the
advantage of any foreign nation." 97 Of this phrase, Justice Reed wrote
that it "requires those prosecuted to have acted in bad faith." 98  This
analysis makes sense in the context of Gorin because the statutory
requirement implies some sort of bad-faith motive-not just a basis for
knowledge that harm might occur, but something akin to complicity in
the harm that could occur. In the broader "could be used" context of §
793(e), the potential impact of a bad-faith requirement is ambiguous.
Judge Ellis asserts that it helps cure any vagueness or overbreadth
challenges because, at least with respect to intangible information, it
requires that the actor have a "bad faith purpose to either harm the
United States or to aid a foreign government" or at least a reckless
disregard of the probability that disclosure will have that effect.99 Of all
the supposed limitations that judicial construction has placed on the Act,
this is the most persuasive defense to vagueness and overbreadth claims,
because whatever the breadth of the provision, it at least seems to require
some proof of recklessness or bad motive. However, it presumably only
applies to intangible information, and the more general "willfulness"
standard applies to everything else.
Judge Ellis also gives a limiting effect to "willfulness," and there is
some evidence in his opinion that he intends to impose similar
culpability requirements on the communication of both tangible and
intangible information.'t°  Such a merger could potentially have a
97. Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 27-28 (1941) (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 28.
99. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
100. See, e.g., id. at 625 (noting that, even with respect to the disclosure of tangible information,
the government must prove that the defendants willfully violated the Act).
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significant limiting effect on the scope of the statute, but ultimately,
Judge Ellis maintains the statutory distinction. The Supreme Court has,
in certain contexts, defined "willfulness" to require a "bad motive"10' or
"evil motive,' 0 2 but the furthest Rosen deigns to go is to equate
willfulness with "specific intent to do something that the law forbids.",
0 3
This is not the same as the aforementioned bad-faith requirement that the
actor actually intend to harm the United States or aid a foreign
government, and Judge Ellis makes the distinction clear with the
following illustration:
For example, if a person transmitted classified documents relating to
the national defense to a member of the media despite knowing that
such an act was a violation of the statute, he could be convicted for
"willfully" committing the prohibited acts even if he viewed the
disclosure as an act of patriotism. By contrast, the "reason to believe"
scienter requirement that accompanies disclosures of information,
requires the government to demonstrate the likelihood of defendant's
bad faith purpose to either harm the United States or to aid a foreign
government.
Thus, Judge Ellis preserves the difference in treatment between
tangible and intangible information. While interpreting willfulness to
require specific intent has some limiting effect on the statute, it does not
cure the vagueness or overbreadth problems. It still does not clarify what
specifically constitutes harm to the United States or aid to a foreign
government, and, at least with respect to tangible information, it still
seems to threaten liability to anyone familiar with the broad prohibitions
of the Espionage Act who disseminates national security information to
an audience not authorized to receive it.
Judge Ellis notes that sustaining the subsection rests on the
presumption that the government will only apply it to "situations in
which national security is genuinely at risk,"'0 5 but such a limitation
hardly provides notice to journalists when both the statute and the courts
refuse to delve further into what the law means by "risk." Ellis renders
the warning toothless by using it to advocate a jury instruction that
simply repeats the language of the statute instead of making any effort to
101. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933).
102. Spurr v. United States, 174 U.S. 728, 734 (1899).
103. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 625 n.30 (quoting United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071
(4th Cir. 1988)).
104. Id. at 626.
105. Id. at 639.
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clarify the gravity or type of risk needed to justify a guilty verdict.
10 6
Thus, the court leaves the jury with a purportedly narrower instruction
that, in actuality, the government can still twist at will to encompass all
"information [that] is both classified and secret."'' 0 7 Surely, there are less
invasive means of protecting national security than a provision that
potentially has the effect of criminalizing the communication of any
classified information, and surely such an act portends the type of
chilling effect that the overbreadth doctrine serves to prevent.
3. First Amendment Right of Free Speech
The other significant constitutional argument that the defendants
make in Rosen with respect to analyzing the media's liability under the
Act is the more specific contention that applying § 793(e) to them
violates their First Amendment right to free speech. 0 8  It is in his
analysis of this argument that Judge Ellis addresses the issue of applying
the statute to nongovernment officials, or as he puts it: those who "have
not exploited a relationship of trust to obtain the national defense
information they are charged with disclosing, but instead [have]
generally obtained the information from one who has violated such a
trust."1
09
The implications of his decision, as it relates to the media, are
particularly apparent because the primary precedent he relies on is the
"Pentagon Papers" case, 110 which was a media case. In finding for The
New York Times in that case, the Supreme Court rested much of its
conclusion on the distinction in First Amendment jurisprudence between
prior restraints and subsequent punishments."' Thus, while the Court
denied the government's request for an injunction (a prior restraint)
prohibiting the Times from publishing, at least three of the concurring
106. Id. at 639 ("Judge Wilkinson and Judge Phillips in Morison insisted on the need for a jury
instruction limiting 'information relating to the national defense' to information 'potentially
damaging to the United States or ... useful to an enemy of the United States."') (citing Morison, 844
F.2d 1057, 1084 (Wilkinson, J., concurring)).
107. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 84, at 399.
108. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 610.
109. Id. at 635.
110. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
Ill. See, e.g., id. at 733 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]erminating the ban on publication of the
relatively few sensitive documents the Government now seeks to suppress does not mean that the
law either requires or invites newspapers or others to publish them or that they will be immune from
criminal action if they do."). The Court has interpreted the First Amendment "as providing greater
protection from prior restraints than from subsequent punishments." Alexander v. United States, 509
U.S. 544, 554 (1993).
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justices seemed to reason that prosecuting the Times under the Espionage
Act after it published the information (a subsequent punishment) would
be constitutionally permissible."'
One can hardly fault Judge Ellis for his acceptance of the Court's
dicta in this case. As he points out in his opinion, "lower courts 'are
bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta almost as firmly as by
the Court's outright holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of
recent vintage and not enfeebled by any subsequent statement.'"' 13
The problem, therefore, rests with the actual "Pentagon Papers"
dicta. Rather than thoroughly examining the Act and its
constitutionality, the Justices appear to rest their conclusions primarily
on the abstract delineation of the law of prior restraints and subsequent
punishments, in effect making the very unremarkable declaration that
subsequent punishments are easier to justify than prior restraints.
The Espionage Act is used by the Court to fill in the blanks. In
essence, after combing the annals of statutory authority, the Court saw
the Act as the appropriate subsequent punishment to fit the kind of
situation at hand. And thus, the Court appeared to impart the
government with authority it had never before and has not since
attempted to exercise.
The problem with using the "Pentagon Papers" case as a precedent in
favor of using § 793(e) to prosecute the media is that it glosses over the
constitutional counterarguments, which the Court had no reason to
consider because the issue was not before it. At least with the justices
who advocated use of the Espionage Act to prosecute the media, the
theme-excepting, of course, the Court's firm rejection of prior
restraints-was pronounced deference to this amorphous conception of
''national security." Only Justice Black seemed to recognize the real
nature of the problem, declaring that "[t]he word 'security' is a broad,
vague generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the
fundamental law embodied in the First Amendment."
'" 4
Instead of taking the opportunity to refine the term and the
permissibility of First Amendment infringement in the name of its
protection, the Court "did little to clarify the definition of national
security or establish guidelines the government could follow to safeguard
112. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing prosecution of newspapers under the
Espionage Act).
113. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (citing McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st
Cir. 1991)).
114. N.Y. Times Co., 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
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its interests." ' 1 5 As such, it provided general support for the proposition
that the government can use § 793(e) to prosecute the press, but it did
this without properly explicating the constitutional principles underlying
its decision.
Typically, courts subject speech restrictions to what is essentially a
two-pronged analysis. They look at the legitimacy of the government
interest that the restriction serves and the scope of the restriction relative
to the interest-i.e., whether it extends beyond what is necessary to
protect the interest." 6  Courts apply this general analysis regardless of
whether the restriction is content-based or content-neutral, 1 7 although
they grant the government more latitude with restrictions they view as
content neutral.'1 8  Even these lesser scrutinized restrictions, however,
should still encompass a scope "no greater than [what] is essential to the
furtherance of [the government] interest.""
9
With respect to the Espionage Act, clearly national security is an
important and often compelling government interest worthy of
protection. Yet, judicial decisions analyzing the Act seem to wholly skip
over the second part of the analysis, never deigning to question whether a
less restrictive means would accomplish the same purpose. It is almost
as if, simply by uttering the mantra of "national security," the
government can push further First Amendment analysis out the
window.' 
20
115. Klein, supra note 89, at 443.
116. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004) ("When plaintiffs
challenge a content-based speech restriction, the burden is on the Government to prove that the
proposed alternatives will not be as effective as the challenged statute."); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) ("[A] content-neutral regulation will be sustained if 'it furthers an
important or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.' (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))).
117. "As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based." Turner Broad Sys., 512 U.S.
at 643. "Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
118. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 544 (2001) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (contrasting
the more lenient approach for content-neutral regulations with the more hostile strict security
standard of content-based regulation).
119. Turner Broad Sys., 512 U.S. at 662.
120. See James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy After the Cold War. The Role of Congress, 34
B.C. L. REV. 451, 452 (1993) ("Although this issue has obvious First Amendment dimensions, the




Some degree of this judicial deference makes sense. Obviously the
Court does not play the same role in foreign policy and national defense
as do the other branches of government. As such, it is in a lesser position
to determine which information leaks could genuinely imperil national
security. 12  The Court also recognizes that the Constitution allocates
"foreign affairs powers to the political branches."'
' 22
But while this observation might call for some constitutional
tiptoeing, it does not warrant a blank check as to governmental
restrictions on national security-related speech, particularly considering
the probability that the speech, if not for its national security status,
would play an important role in informing the public about government
policy and national affairs. The Court is right to recognize national
security as a vital government interest, but it also has the responsibility
of ensuring that the government protects that interest in such a way that
minimizes the infringement of First Amendment liberties. Section
793(e) unnecessarily usurps First Amendment rights, and the Court
should compel the government to draft a law that more effectively
respects this balance.
C. Analyzing the Legislative Intent of the Espionage Act and its
Application to the Media
Another argument that weighs against using § 793(e) of the
Espionage Act against the press derives from the legislative history of
the statute. Pertinent parts of the legislative record indicate that
Congress did not intend to use the Act against the media.
1. The Press Censorship Provision
In 1917, Congress almost passed the initial Act with an explicit press
censorship provision23 President Wilson argued that the "authority to
exercise censorship over the press . . . is absolutely necessary to the
121. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-29 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("If the Constitution gives the Executive a large degree of unshared power in the conduct of foreign
affairs and the maintenance of our national defense, then under the Constitution the Executive must
have the largely unshared duty to determine and preserve the degree of internal security necessary to
exercise that power successfully.")
122. Ferguson, supra note 120, at 452.
123. See supra Part I.A (detailing Congress's rejection of the press censorship provision).
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public safety.' 2 4 Congress, nevertheless, defeated the provision after a
flurry of First Amendment debate. 
25
The provision Congress defeated bears some similarity to how
certain elements within the government would interpret § 793(e) today.
That provision would have allowed the government to prosecute the
press for publishing information that "the President, in his judgment,
declared to be 'of such character that is or might be useful to the
enemy.' ' 126 The imagination does not have to stretch too far to note the
similarity between information that "is or might be useful to the enemy"
and § 793(e)'s reference to information that "could be used to the injury
of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.", 
27
Arguably, in fact, § 793(e) casts a broader net over materials subject to
restriction, encompassing information and materials "relating to the
national defense," whereas the defeated Press Censorship Provision
limited its scope to what "might be useful to the enemy."
Section 793(e), of course, does not give the President unilateral
authority to determine which information is or is not protected, and, at
least with respect to intangible information, it does have the specific
intent requirement that the guilty party have "reason to believe [the
information] could be used to the injury of the United States or to the
advantage of any foreign nation"'128 Nevertheless, it is the executive
branch that is responsible for classifying most information,' 29 and so in
actuality, if the government could use the subsection to prosecute the
media, the power to do so would still reside primarily in the Executive.
2. The 1950 Amendment
Congress passed the Act's 1950 amendment, which introduced §
793(e), at the height of Cold War paranoia. In amending the Act,
Congress once again had the opportunity to explicitly proscribe media
publication of national defense information, and once again, it refused to
124. Stone, supra note 20, at 349 (quoting Wilson Demands Press Censorship, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 1917, at 1 (quoting a letter from Woodrow Wilson to Rep. Webb)).
125. See supra Part II.A (describing the substance of the debate over the press censorship
provision).
126. Stone, supra note 20, at 345 (quoting the press censorship provision as presented to
Congress).
127. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2000).
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1)(A) (2000) (exempting from Freedom of Information Act
information that is "specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy").
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do so. Moreover, just as with the original 1917 act, legislative history
indicates that this refusal was not an unconscious omission. According
to Professors Edgar and Schmidt, Jr., "fears that the new subsections
793(d) and (e) might make criminal actions taken by newspapers in 'the
normal course of their operations' were rebutted by statements by the
Attorney General and by the Legislative Reference Service."'
' 30
Additionally, the 1950 amendment to the Act also included a
provision that explicitly protected the press, declaring that:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize, require, or establish
military or civilian censorship or in any way to limit or infringe upon
freedom of the press or of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States and no regulation shall be promulgated hereunder
having that effect."131
Thus, just as with the initial act in 1917, it does not appear that
Congress foresaw prosecuting the press by virtue of the amendments it
added in 1950.
D. The Policy Considerations Underlying the Issue of Media Liability
Under the Act
The significance of the "free press" is something that commentators
and political figures have been opining about since the country's
formation. The founders thought enough of the concept to mention the
"free press" separately in the Bill of Rights. They saw a special
importance in the role of the press. Otherwise, they might have plugged
in "free speech" and left it at that, assuming logically that the right of the
press would be subsumed therein.
But they saw more than typical free speech interests at stake in this
context; they viewed the press as a check on government power.
132
Exerting the force of public opinion between elections or in place of
impeachment, an independent 'fourth branch' of government was seen
as helping enforce the formal and informal rules of just politics. A free
press "subject only to liability for personal injuries," Thomas Jefferson
130. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 33, at 1030.
131. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, § 1, 64 Stat. 987, 987.
132. JEFFERY A. SMITH, WAR AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE PROBLEM OF PREROGATIVE POWER 28
(1999).
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said, brings public officials before the "tribunal of public opinion" and
thereby "produces reform peaceably . ,,133
Inexplicably, the Court has never formally recognized the press as an
entity with distinct constitutional rights,134 although some would say the
Court's decisions implicitly make this recognition.135  But the Framers'
view of the press's importance persists in modern times. Justice Potter
Stewart posited that "[t]he primary purpose of the constitutional
guarantee of a free press was ... to create a fourth institution outside the
Government as an additional check on the three official branches.", 36 "A
fundamental tenet of our First Amendment tradition is that the press does
not simply report what public officials say, but acts instead as a
'watchdog' over the government." 137
Thus, at play with respect to the Espionage Act are two competing
policy interests: on one side, the inviolability of the free press and its role
in enforcing government transparency and public political participation,
and on the other side, national security. Both are of paramount
importance, and so the natural goal would be that infringement on one
interest in favor of the other would be as unrestrictive as possible.
The media's role in checking the government becomes more
important in contexts where the branches of the government are less
capable of checking themselves. As noted earlier, the power to designate
information as "secret" for the purposes of national defense is mostly a
province of the Executive, one which it exercises quite liberally. The
government is incredibly effective at producing secret information. In
1997, Senator Daniel Moynihan noted that the government created
6,610,154 secrets in one year-98.6% of those via executive order.1 38 In
2004, the government classified documents 15.6 million times, spending
$7.2 billion to secure the information. 39 A vigilant and active press acts
133. Id.
134. See David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 455, 456
(1983) (stating that the Supreme Court has declined to give independent significance to the "freedom
of the press" clause found in the First Amendment).
135. See, e.g., Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (arguing that
the freedom of the organized press has a distinct role under the Constitution as recognized by
Supreme Court decisions).
136. Id. at634.
137. Jonathan Mermin, Free But Not Independent: The Real First Amendment Issue for the
Press, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 929, 929 (2005) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
138. 150 CONG. REC. S9700-02, S9715 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2004) (statement of Sen. Wyden).
139. OPENTHEGOVERNMENT.ORG, SECRECY REPORT CARD 2005: QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS
OF SECRECY IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1 (2005).
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as a check on this significant power. As Justice Stewart notes in the
"Pentagon Papers" case: "In the absence of the governmental checks and
balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective
restraint upon executive policy and power in the areas of national
defense and international affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry...
,,140 Punishing the media for publishing national defense-related
information without providing clearer and narrower restrictions unfairly
undermines the media's ability to serve this important purpose.
Those officials who would support using the Act to prosecute the
media frequently reference the advent of the War on Terror. 14 1 Clearly,
the War on Terror presents unique challenges related to government
intelligence and national security that are applicable to the Espionage
Act, but so too did World War One, which ushered in the original Act,
and the Cold War, which ushered in the Act's most significant
amendment.
The truth is the government can always find justification for secrecy.
Times change but the underlying reasoning remains the same. The CIA
was talking about the "proliferation of terrorism" as justification for
"clandestine activities" more than a decade before the attacks of
September 11, 2001-in addition to "heightened Soviet intelligence
profile, changes in Eastern Europe .. . .narcotics, Third World arms
production and regional conflicts."'
142
Equally timeless are the First Amendment arguments for the public's
right to know-arguments that perhaps become even more important
specifically at those junctures where the government claims a heightened
need for secrecy, instances where "there may well be a confusion of the
interests of the administration in power with the interests of the
nation. ' ' 143  Given the breadth of the Act and judicial deference to its
authority, there seems a high likelihood of abuse-of the government
140. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
141. Representative Oxley opined:
Unfortunately, a one-day story in the New York Times can ruin years of careful work by
those who work to map terrorist networks and the flow of terrorist money. Obviously,
the editors of the New York Times are more concerned about their sagging circulation
rates and about damaging the Bush administration than they are about disrupting terrorist
financing.
152 CONG. REc. H4875-02, H4876 (daily ed. June 29, 2006) (statement of Rep. Oxley).
142. Klein, supra note 89, at 434.
143. David H. Topol, Note, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First Amendment Right to
Publish National Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REV. 581, 600 (1992) (quoting Thomas 1.
Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 78, 80-81 (1982)).
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relying on the "broad concept of national security to justify secrecy
decisions based on political considerations.' 44
The problems do not necessarily have to stem from conscious abuse.
For instance, consider the issue in the context of the NSA domestic
wiretaps story in The New York Times. 14 5 Is this a case of a media outlet
publishing information that legitimately threatens national security or a
case of the government trying to conceal questionable conduct that
would open it to public criticism? Or is it both, and if so, in which
category does it fit better? These are nuanced questions that lack hard
and fast answers. Certainly they are issues that should preclude
application of one-size-fits-all secrecy laws that not only give the
government broad authority to impose secrecy but also broad
prosecutorial power to enforce it.
IV. ANALYSIS: REFINING THE STATUTE: POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
A. The General Premise
Admittedly, there is cogency in the notion of a completely
unrestricted press, and there are commentators, such as University of
Richmond Law Professor Rodney A. Smolla, who advanced such an
argument:
Respect for the structural independence of the media contemplated by
the Constitution prohibits courts from conscripting journalists as leak-
police. A bright line is required here. The journalist cannot be forced
to ask the government source who hands her the document: "Are you
sure this is legal? Are you sure this is not under seal?
146
The bright line Smolla advocates does not concern the nature of the
information in question at all, but rather how journalists acquire it. If
they steal it, they are "subject to whatever generally applicable legal
penalties may apply.' ' 147 On the other hand, if someone simply hands
them the information, they "may examine it and publish it.'
148
144. See Ferguson, supra note 120, at 462 (discussing the Executive's "incentives to avoid
embarrassment and political setbacks by concealing evidence of failures, mistakes and misconduct").
145. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 18.
146. Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability Jbr
Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1168-69 (2002) (citation omitted).




These arguments definitely ring with a certain amount of libertarian
appeal, but perhaps a more apt approach is that advocated by Zechariah
Chafee, Jr. only a couple years following the passage of the original
Espionage Act: "[L]et us recognize the issue as a conflict between two
vital principles, and endeavor to find the basis of reconciliation between
order and freedom."'149 Few would argue that the government has no
legitimate interest in protecting national security information from
disclosure, and few would argue that the free press does not, itself, also
serve a vital societal interest. Thus, the logical goal is balance, and if the
problem with the Act, in particular, is overbreadth and vagueness, the
solution is to narrow it with judicial or congressional refinement.
B. Congressional Refinement
Of these, congressional refinement is the preferred solution.
Additional judicial construction could also be beneficial, but the problem
is that "while the broad literal meaning of the subsections is almost
certainly unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the statutory language
does not point toward any one confined reading as a means of saving
them."' 150  Thus, revision is more properly within the ambit of
congressional responsibility. In this way, Congress ensures that
whatever law emerges is an accurate reflection of its intent and not
merely speculative judicial construction.
The focus of the refinement should emphasize more precise
definitions of "information relating to the national security" and "injury"
in the context of information that "could be used to the injury of the
United States." The easiest way to clarify "national security" is probably
to delineate specific situations or types of content that implicate the
broader concept. For instance, Congress might proscribe the
communication or publication of information related to waging war or
nuclear power or intelligence activities where imprudent revelations
could put operatives in jeopardy.' 51  Of course, war, itself, is an
ambiguous term and would require more specific descriptions of
prohibited communication, such as that pertaining to troop movements or
technology, for example. Statutory models that cast the national security
149. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932,937 (1919).
150. Edgar& Schmidt, Jr., supra note 33, at 1000.
151. See Susan F. Sandier, Note, National Security Versus Free Speech: A Comparative Analysis
of Publication Review Standards in the United States and Great Britian, 15 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 711,
749-50 (1989) (arguing for the creation of new governmental agencies that could develop guidelines
for these situations).
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issue in a narrower light already exist. One such statute is another
provision within the Espionage Act, § 798, which specifically prohibits
publishing certain information about the country's intelligence
activities. 152
Beyond a more precise definition of "information relating to the
national defense," the legislature may also give greater clarity to the
concept of information disclosures that "could be used to the injury of
the United States." One advocated approach is to only allow prosecution
in cases where serious harm actually occurs and the government can
demonstrate a causal connection between the harm and the disclosure.
153
The ideal revision would incorporate both methods of refinement.
Alerting people to specific situations that implicate national security
interests would put them on notice as to when they might be acting
within the scope of the statute. Requiring some measurable harm to
occur as a result of their disclosure would correct the potentially fuzzy
application of the Act as it exists now, where a court can find guilt even
for disclosures that merely could cause harm. The statute might even go
further and specify particular types of harm that would result in liability,
such as revealing information that causes loss of life or affords some sort
of measurable advantage to an enemy, and it could authorize a balancing
test weighing the negative consequences of the disclosure against any
positive ones, such as its service to the public interest. Such a statute
would strike a better compromise between the interests of free speech
and free press and the secrecy that national security sometimes
necessitates.
152. See supra note 32 (containing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (2000)). It is worth noting that
the constitutionality of § 798 is also a matter of debate. At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing,
journalist Gabriel Schoenfeld declared it "free from all the ambiguities and constitutional problems
that beset the 1917 Espionage Act." Examining DOJ's Investigation of Journalists Who Publish
Classified Information: Lessons from the Jack Anderson Case Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Gabriel Schoenfeld, Senior Editor, Commentary), available at
judiciary-senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1928. Meanwhile, journalist Jack Shafer cast doubt on the
constitutionality of the statute, raising discussion of the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines. Jack
Shafer, Bill Keller in Chains, SLATE, Mar. 9, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2137792.
153. See James A. Goldston, Jennifer M. Granholm & Robert J. Robison, A Nation Less Secure:
Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 409, 449 (1986) (arguing for
general application of a three-pronged test that subjects actors to prosecution only when "(a) the
disclosure has resulted in direct and irreparable damage to the nation's military security; (b) such
damage clearly outweighs the contribution to public debate and understanding; and (c) the accused
intended to impair the national defense capability"); see also David R. Dow & R. Scott Shieldes,
Rethinking the Clear and Present Danger Test, 73 IND. L.J. 1217, 1218-19 (1998) ("The Free
Speech Clause should protect all speech unless three conditions are satisfied: (1) the speaker's
specific intent in uttering the speech is to cause an unlawful injury, (2) the injury in fact occurs as a
proximate result of the speech, and (3) the speaker, through his or her speech, overwhelmed (i.e.,




Of course, while statutory refinement may be the optimal solution, in
the meantime, defending the First Amendment is the obligation of the
Court. In his "Pentagon Papers" opinion, Justice Black offers the
following quote of James Madison: "If they (the first ten amendments)
are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of justice
will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those
rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the Legislative or Executive . . . . Presumably, "every
assumption of power" includes the restriction of information in the
interest of national security.
In this case, as the central problem of the statute is the unwieldy
range of information it potentially restricts, the solution is to narrow the
restriction. The judiciary could accomplish this in several ways. The
simplest, from its perspective, would be to push the matter back to the
legislature by finding the statute to be facially overbroad or void for
vagueness. However, considering that the relevant precedents have
unanimously rejected these claims, so extreme a turnaround seems an
unlikely hope.
The subtler approach would be the one that courts have already
taken-narrowing the provision through judicial construction. Although
the results have been arguably dubious, courts have already worked
somewhat to shrink the specter of "information relating to the national
defense."' 156 By giving some narrowing effect to what constitutes harm
to the United States, they might have some real impact on lending the
provision a more navigable, First Amendment-friendly breadth.
In the context of media cases, courts might also consider how a
journalist acquires the information as relevant to the inquiry. For
instance, courts might grant greater latitude to the press in circumstances
where acquisition of the sensitive information was lawful-i.e., in
circumstances where a government source voluntarily leaks the
information-than in situations where acquisition was unlawful, such as
when a journalist steals a secret document. Such a distinction would be
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, which, while not addressing
154. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 n.5 (1971) (Black, J., concurring)
(quoting I ANNALS OF CONG. 439) (alterations in original).
155. See supra Part IlI.B. 1-2 (addressing application of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
to § 793(e)).
156. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (discussing judicial construction of the phrase "information
relating to the national defense").
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the government's power to punish the publication of unlawfully acquired
information, "has repeatedly held that 'if a newspaper lawfully obtains
truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need ... of the highest order.""1
57
Of course, for any limitation to occur, the Court needs to shake itself
somewhat of its aforementioned deference to the Executive in matters of
national security. In United States v. Robel,158 the Court considered a
statute that prohibited members of the Communist Party from working at
defense facilities. 159  Congress sought to defend the statute on the
grounds that it was passed pursuant to the "war power" established in the
Constitution. 1
60
Noting the Court's historical deference to the war power, Chief
Justice Warren nevertheless struck down the provision as overbroad,
admonishing Congress that the "'war power' cannot be invoked as a
talismanic incantation to support any exercise of congressional power
which can be brought within its ambit."' 6 1  The phrase "national
security" can take on a talismanic quality of its own, and while deferring
to the legitimate measures the government takes in the name of security,
the Court must not sink into an "executive-judicial partnership" by
ratifying the illegitimate measures. 62  In the context of § 793(e), the
court can fulfill this responsibility by placing greater limitations on the
information that the provision restricts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Espionage Act has remained largely unchanged for nearly a
century, § 793(e), in particular, for nearly sixty years. In its current state,
the Act poses a growing threat to the interests of the free press, a threat
that inevitably will be manifested if Congress or the courts do not take
action to prevent it. Judicial decisions analyzing the Act, if anything,
have become less deferent to the First Amendment, choosing instead to
157. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527-28 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
158. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
159. Id. at 260.
160. Id. at 263.
161. Id.
162. See Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 84, at 394 (noting that the "Executive's recent efforts
to apply the murky espionage statutes to government employees-possibly leading to prosecution




bow to the government's conception of national security. Rosen, while
still young in its proceedings, represents the latest stage of this trend,
allowing, for the first time, the application of the Act against
nongovernment officials. Conceivably, the next step could be
prosecution of the press for publishing national security information. If
the Pentagon Papers case is really a "loaded gun pointed at newspapers
and reporters who publish foreign policy and defense secrets," 163 as
Professors Edgar and Schmidt, Jr. suggest it is, then perhaps Rosen is the
courts effectively pulling back the hammer.
Undoubtedly, a degree of secrecy certainly benefits national security.
But it is just as certain that too much secrecy harms it. 164 In light of this,
the breadth and vagueness of § 793(e) are too much. As even Judge Ellis
concedes in Rosen, "the time is ripe for Congress to engage in a thorough
review and revision of these provisions." 165 However, if Congress fails
to act, the responsibility falls to the courts as the protectors of the First
Amendment. Zechariah Chafee, Jr. found the proper balance nearly
ninety years ago, when following passage of the Espionage Act, he said,
"[T]he great interest in free speech should be sacrificed only when the
interest in public safety is really imperiled, and not, as most men believe,
when it is barely conceivable that it may be slightly affected."'
166
163. Edgar & Schmidt, Jr., supra note 33, at 936.
164. See, e.g., Goldston, Granholm & Robison, supra note 153, at 450 ("The nation's security,
as conventionally understood-encompassing both the technical fitness of its military forces as well
as the strategic image which the nation projects among allies and adversaries-has been impaired by
the secret formulation of poorly conceived policies. Had the policymaking apparatus accommodated
more criticism in open debate, it is likely that, at least in some instances, waste and ineptitude could
have been discovered, flawed conceptions of national objectives might have been corrected, and
policies that better enhanced national security might have been pursued."). The article cites specific
examples, including President Kennedy's statement to the managing editor of The New York Times
that more extensive publication about the Bay of Pigs operation might have saved the government
from making its "'colossal mistake."' Id. at 451 (quoting FRED W. FRIENDLY & MARTHA J.H.
ELLIOT, THE CONSTITUTION: THAT DELICATE BALANCE 61 (1984)).
165. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 646 (E.D. Va. 2006).
166. Chafee, Jr., supra note 149, at 960.
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